all concerted effort. Had this not been so. there might well have been danger for the Moslems of Syria, for they, too, were at odds with each other, the more powerful among the emirs being out, each for himself, in rivalry for the succession to the power and the estates of Nur ed-din and Zenghi. Saladin had not left them in doubt as to his position. Ibn el Athir quoted a letter sent to the rival chiefs of Damascus, in which Saladin declared flatly that Nur ed-din would not have chosen him to be his agent in Egypt had he not intended him to be his successor in leadership — always, of course, in behalf of his son and heir. He claimed as his right the guardianship of es-Saleh, and the protection of his person and property, and there was no question after his arrival in Damascus that he meant to assert this right by force of arms if necessary. Beyond that there had been the threat of punishment for those emirs who had been false to their trust. Nominally this meant their duty to the young King, but the emirs knew well enough the real meaning. Some of them had been treating with the Franks, accepting bribes or paying tribute for aid against their Moslem opponents. This traffic between the common enemy and those of his faith for personal ends always aroused his fierce wrath and scorn. He had far more tolerance for the non-believer than for the backslider among his own, and this traffic was in his eyes equivalent to treachery to God and His Prophet. Having intensified the devotion of the Damascans